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Screened history: Nostalgia as defensive 
formation 
 
Derek Hook 
Birkbeck College, London School of Economics & University of the 
Witwatersrand 
 
This paper re-considers the much-lauded transformative potential of nostalgia, and 
proposes that an adequately psychological engagement with nostalgia is necessary if 
the critical capacities of this phenomenon are to be adequately assessed. In order to 
do this, the paper identifies parallels between the concept of nostalgia and a series 
of psychoanalytic concepts (the imaginary, fetishism, fantasy, affect, screen-
memories and retroaction). Such a comparative analysis allows both for a critique of 
sociological notions of nostalgia and a series of speculations on how nostalgia as a 
defensive formation may aid rather than overcome types of structured forgetting. 
The use of psychoanalytic concepts enables us to grasp how nostalgia may operate: 
1) in the economy of the ego, 2) in the mode of the fetish, 3) in the service of 
fantasy, 4) as an affect concealing anxiety, 5) as screen-memory and, 6) as means of 
reifying past or present rather than attending to relations of causation obtaining 
between past, present and future. One should thus investigate each of these 
possible defensive functions within any given instance of nostalgia before 
proclaiming its transformative potential. 
 
KEYWORDS: Reflective/restorative nostalgia, psychoanalysis, fetish, memory, ego, 
history. 
 
 
The Apartheid Archive Project (AAP) is premised on an attempt to 
retrieve discomforting historical memories of South Africa’s oppressive 
apartheid past (http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/). In an earlier 
discussion of the difficulties inherent in such an objective, I noted that 
resistances to this task – subjective and in some many cases societal – 
seemed to know no bounds (Hook, 2011a). Of course, given the 
traumatic quality of such memories for many who suffered under 
apartheid, the anger and resentment thus occasioned, and of course the 
guilt and sense of complicity for those who number amongst apartheid’s 
beneficiaries, one can appreciate that such memories do not come easy. 
In the light of this challenge, and the AAP’s warning that what is not 
remembered of the apartheid pasts risks being repeated in the post-
apartheid present, one might well take hope in any possible cultural aide 
memoire that might assist in this project of retrieval. The current 
blossoming of nostalgia within South African society – most markedly 
perhaps in literature and popular culture - may seem then to offer a 
critical vehicle of considerable interest (see Gevisser (2011) and Medalie 
(2010) for discussions of the outpouring of nostalgic apartheid-era 
memoirs and (auto)biographies; see Truscott (2011) for an astute 
analysis of nostalgia and melancholic self-parody in South African rap 
music and music festivals). 
 Then again, despite the prevalence of nostalgia as a popular topic 
in post-apartheid South Africa – take for example the media interest 
attracted by the Narratives, nostalgia and nationhoods conference held 
in Johannesburg in July 2011- one needs ask whether nostalgia is, in 
effect, the ‘right problematic’. I note this not only due to the obvious 
political reasons – that the bittersweet enjoyment of memories of 
apartheid seems morally dubious - but due to concerns both clinical and 
intellectual. In embracing the topic of nostalgia are we unwittingly 
endorsing a style of memory that amounts to a defensive formation, an 
obstruction rather than an asset to the project of retrieving recalcitrant 
(or indeed traumatic) memories? This is the crucial question around 
which my speculative comments in this paper turn. The issue of the 
types of memory to be prioritized as means of facilitating the working-
through of historical trauma in post-apartheid South Africa is of 
importance to those interested in the resolution of ongoing socio-
political conflicts, indeed, in the broad agendas of peace psychology. For 
if what divides communities is in part a function not only of history, but 
of partially recollected and/or differently recalled histories, then an 
exploration of different modalities of memory constitutes a clear socio-
political imperative. Such projects of historical retrieval, of different 
types of remembering, hold out the promise of viewing the past anew, 
and consolidating a new order based on a joint commitment to 
confronting and ‘working-through’ a divisive history. 
 Several qualifications are in order here. Although my objectives 
here are critical, my concern is not simply to jettison the notion of 
nostalgia, but to open it up for further reflection from a distinctive 
psychoanalytic vantage-point. My aim is not to dismiss the critical 
potential of those retrievals of history that ostensibly ‘reflective’ types of 
nostalgia allow for. It is rather to expand upon certain of the possible 
underlying psychical operations occurring within nostalgia, and thereby 
to offer commentary on how the critical propensities of so-called 
reflective nostalgia might in fact be usefully augmented, or critiqued. 
Such an exercise will require both a careful attention to how nostalgia is 
being defined, and to the psychoanalytic concepts – those of the 
imaginary, fetishism, the affective, the screen-memory and retroaction – 
that I apply in my critique of this concept.  
To stress, from the outset: whilst much of nostalgia might be 
shown to possess a defensive function, we should nonetheless remain 
aware of its potentially destabilizing or ‘unselfing’ potential, that is, 
nostalgia’s prospective ability to unseat prevailing norms and 
orthodoxies. Like the speech of the patient of psychoanalysis, nostalgia – 
we might venture – may present in primarily defensive forms whilst 
nonetheless providing an instrument to access precisely what is being 
defended. Making this point ushers in the tricky issue of the distinction 
between ostensibly individual as opposed to predominantly societal 
forms of nostalgia. Of course, this is a distinction we may wish to 
complicate inasmuch as these two categories of reality are necessarily 
juxtaposed; they are inherently intermeshed, and thus ultimately 
indivisible.  
In what follows my focus will be predominantly on the latter, on 
socio-political nostalgia (nostalgia within the parameters of popular 
discourse), with the important caveat that such forms of nostalgia 
should themselves be seen as subject to the psychical processes that 
characterize nostalgia’s individualized forms. The broader question of 
the relation between the subjective and the socio-political in 
(post)apartheid contexts is one I have tackled at some length elsewhere 
(Hook, 2008). Suffice for now to say that a psychoanalytic perspective 
needs to appreciate the unique perspective of an individual’s own 
particular engagement with social reality (that is, with what is 
distinctively nostalgic to them), while emphasizing nevertheless that 
such engagements remain always mediated by – cut from the cloth of – 
socio-symbolic reality.  
 
In defence of nostalgia 
 
Cognisant of the wealth of literature on nostalgia (Davis, 1977, 1979; 
Kaplan, 1987; Kleiner, 1977; Smith, 1998; Stauth & Turner, 1988; 
Tannock, 1995), I will limit my discussion by focussing largely on the 
distinctions between ostensibly progressive (i.e. potentially 
transformative) and regressive (or rehabilitative) types of nostalgia, and 
by highlighting material most pertinent to the post-apartheid context. 
Clearly, given the perspective I adopt here, I will also attend to those 
facets of nostalgia of particular pertinence to a psychoanalytic 
conceptualization. 
 This prospect of nostalgia as critical instrument owes much to 
Boym’s (2001) landmark The Future of Nostalgia which poses the 
distinction between restorative and reflective types of nostalgia. Boym 
admits of her distinction that these two types “do not explain the nature 
of longing nor its psychological makeup and unconscious currents” (p. 
41). It is precisely this missing psychical dimension that I wish to 
comment upon in what follows. Boym gathers a variety of perspectives 
on nostalgia that are worth sampling as a means of introducing the 
concept. “Nostalgia is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has 
never existed” (p. xiii). It is a sentiment moreover “of loss and 
displacement” (p. xiii), an “ache of temporal distance” (p. 44), but also “a 
romance with one’s own fantasy” (p. xiii). Although by no means limited 
to modernity, nostalgia “inevitably reappears as a defense mechanism in 
a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheaval” (p. xiv). 
Boym does not deny that nostalgia possesses mechanisms of seduction 
and manipulation. For her nostalgia entails not just a rhythm of longing, 
but also “enticements and entrapments” (p.xvi). Importantly also, 
particular given our concerns with the post-apartheid context, 
“Outbreaks of nostalgia often follow revolutions” (p. xiv), or we might 
extrapolate, the advent of socio-political transition. 
Boym splits nostalgia as ‘longing for a return to home’ into two 
overlapping categories: one weighted towards the objective of such a 
return, the other more focussed on the vicissitudes of longing itself: 
 
Restorative nostalgia… attempts a transhistorical 
reconstruction of the lost home. Reflective nostalgia thrives 
in…the longing itself, and delays the homecoming…ironically, 
desperately. Restorative nostalgia does not think of itself as 
nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition. Reflective nostalgia 
dwells on the ambivalences of human longing and belonging 
and does not shy away from the contradictions of modernity. 
Restorative nostalgia protects the absolute truth, while 
reflective nostalgia calls it into doubt (p. xviii). 
 
“Reflective nostalgia” she continues “explores ways of inhabiting many 
places at once and imagining different time zones” (p. 41). It “cherishes 
shattered fragments of memory”, it values not so much the lost home as 
“the emotional resonance of distance” (p. 49). Ironic and inconclusive it 
remains “aware of the gap between identity and resemblance” (p. 49). 
Furthermore:  
 
At best reflective nostalgia can represent an ethical or creative 
challenge… This typology of nostalgia allows us to distinguish 
between national memory that is based on a single plot…and 
social memory, which consists of collective frameworks that 
mark but do not define the individual memory (p. xviii). 
 
Boym repeatedly makes restorative nostalgia about communal identity 
and national meta-narratives; as such she grants it a hegemonic 
character. Reflective nostalgia is permitted the latitude of moving 
between collective and individual frames of reference. Whereas the 
former often seems blatantly ideological in its uses, the latter holds out 
a marked ethical potential. It is perhaps worth emphasizing the point – 
sometimes blurred in Boym’s discussion – that it is not nostalgia itself 
which is alternatively progressive or reactionary, but the uses to which it 
is put. 
An often neglected point regards Boym’s (2001) distinction is that 
these are not to be considered mutually-exclusive types, but rather 
trajectories, tendencies – that often overrun one another – of giving 
meaning and shape to nostalgia. While Boym does emphasize this fact, 
her rudimentary typology may be said to under-estimate the difficulties 
of extracting one type from the other. The possibility of such a 
permanent juxtaposition poses a degree of ‘undecidability’, the prospect 
that is to say – a point not conceded by Boym - of ostensibly regressive 
nostalgia nonetheless holding out progressive potential, and the related 
prospect of progressive nostalgia concealing a set of reactionary 
investments.  
Pickering and Keightley’s influential (2006) analysis of the concept 
of nostalgia makes the case for the critical rejuvenation of an idea they 
feel has typically been viewed as reactionary, sentimental, even 
melancholic. They respond to a tendency to view nostalgia as nothing 
more than a defeatist retreat from the present. There is of course some 
truth to the view that nostalgia is about the present rather than the past 
(Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979), occasioned as it is by current anxieties, 
discomforts or perceived losses, hence their gloss of nostalgia as “the 
composite feeling of loss, lack and longing” (p. 921)). The backward 
glance of nostalgia is thus a means of mediating the present and the 
prospective future. Nonetheless, Pickering & Keightley (2006) argue that 
nostalgia occurs within multiple registers; it has numerous 
manifestations, its meaning and significance are diverse; it “should be 
seen as accommodating progressive, even utopian impulses as well as 
regressive stances” (p. 919). Their hope is that we might be able to 
distinguish between the desire to return to an earlier state or idealized 
past, and the desire not to return “but recognize aspects of the past as 
the basis for renewal and satisfaction in the future” (p. 921). Nostalgia 
might function then as a compass, a means of direction amidst the 
uncertainties and predicaments of the present and future: 
 
This opens up a positive dimension in nostalgia, one associated 
with desire for engagement with difference, with aspiration 
and critique…There are cases where past-fixated melancholic 
reactions to the present prevail, and other where utopian 
longings drift free of any actual ontological basis in the present 
(p. 921). 
 
Pickering & Keightley (2006) stress repeatedly the mutually constitutive 
interrelations of both such dimensions of nostalgia; it is by virtue of this 
relation “that the potential for sociological critique arises” (p. 921). Such 
an emphasis on the complexity of nostalgia and the simultaneity of its 
regressive and progressive movements is to be welcomed; it warns 
against any naïve idealization of the phenomenon, and signals the 
political ambiguity of nostalgic reminiscence.  
 
Apartheid nostalgia 
 
David Medalie’s discussion of the uses of nostalgia in post-apartheid 
fiction adds to the above differentiation. What he refers to as ‘evolved’ 
nostalgia “recognizes the extent to which the present invests in 
narratives of the past [along with]…the constructedness of memory” (p. 
40). Such a nostalgia draws attention to the partiality of what is recalled; 
it makes connections, revises memories and construes a growing set of 
links between past and present. This is an ‘intricate nostalgia’ that opens 
up the possibility of “reinvention and the fashioning of new, rather than 
received, meanings” (p. 42). By contrast, unreflecting forms of nostalgia 
fail to subject the past to adequate interrogation. The past here is fixed, 
sealed off “in its unique remoteness”; it becomes thus a static utopia, 
irretrievably lost, cut off from any meaningful relations with the present. 
Of particular interest here is not only Medalie’s critique of a given 
mode of nostalgia - “glib, unambitious and utterly lacking in self-
consciousness” (p. 37) - but his indication of how certain formal features 
might be read as an index of the failure of creative uses of the nostalgic 
impulse. What is in question is how formal devices - the language and 
narrative impetus of novels in question, the flatness of characters etc. - 
prove unable to “distance themselves…from the nostalgia” and thus to 
“provide a persuasive critical scrutiny”. This intriguing suggestion of a 
link between artifices of form and a regressive mode of nostalgia will be 
important in what follows.  
A further note of interest in Medalie’s analysis of literary nostalgia 
for apartheid concerns the disingenuous quality evident in some of the 
material: 
 
Ostensibly [such novels]…disown the very nostalgia which they 
have sketched so vividly because they feel it is incumbent 
upon them to do so; but the narrative energy is focused to 
such an extent upon those elements that constitute the 
nostalgia that it leaves one in no doubt as to the force of its 
embrace (p. 37). 
 
This is an astute observation which warns us that even in its most critical 
moments, the ‘libidinal ambience’ of such animated memories 
nonetheless enchant us, hold us in their thrall. We might frame this idea 
psychoanalytically: the factor of critique, of apparent critical distance – 
even of radical opposition - by no means dissipates the ongoing libidinal 
investment in what is being scrutinized.  
Jacob Dlamini’s (2009) Native Nostalgia incorporates Boym’s 
(2001) notions of restorative and reflective nostalgia, utilizing them to 
question current South African longings for its apartheid past. The text 
provides a sense of the type of critique that nostalgia – or in this case, 
personal reminiscence aligned with scholarly reflection – may deliver. 
The ideal of reflective nostalgia here becomes a type of counter-
intuition, a means of unsettling commonplaces and meta-narratives. 
Dlamini’s use of nostalgia is neither restorative nor palliative; it does not 
wish for a return, and it inverts rather than affirms political platitudes. 
One example is the idea, which certainly runs against the grain of 
prevailing struggle histories, that the world of apartheid “was not simply 
black and white, with resisters on one hand and oppressors on the 
other” (p. 56). Apartheid, by contrast, “was a world of moral 
ambivalence and ambiguity in which some people could be both 
resisters and collaborators at the same time” (p. 156). Likewise upended 
is the master narrative of black dispossession that conceals the multiple 
ethnic, gender and class divisions that run through black communities. 
Hence Dlamini’s critique of racial nativists and political entrepreneurs for 
whom, respectively, “there are no local histories, no differences within 
black South Africa” (p. 20), no reason not to “take advantage of the 
valorisation of blackness to enrich themselves” (p. 156).  
Dlamini’s critical procedure is one that mobilizes a series of 
reminiscences that prove discordant in today’s South Africa, and that 
cannot easily be accommodated within prevailing post-apartheid 
sensibilities. In this respect his use of memory appear to conform to 
Boym’s category of reflective category, achieving as it does not only 
defamiliarization and a sense of distance, but a “a re-thinking of the 
relations between past, present and future”, an awareness that “the 
past is not merely that which doesn’t exist anymore, but…[something 
that] might act…by inserting itself into a present sensation”  (p. 50). 
A fascinating deployment of the notion of nostalgia to the topic of 
post-apartheid architecture is to be found in Mbembe (2008) who – 
especially noteworthy for my concerns here – uses the concept in 
alongside a psychoanalytically-informed notion of repressed memories.  
Focussing on a trend of commercial architecture that attempts to evoke 
other times and places, Mbembe speaks of “a mode of 
erasure…accomplished against the duties to memory ritualized by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (2008, p. 62). The mode of 
effacement instantiated by such architecture relies on an escapist art of 
verisimilitude, as in the case of shopping and entertainment complexes 
Montecasino, north of Johannesburg, which aims to invoke the 
atmosphere and feel of a rural Tuscan village. What results is a 
paradoxical inscription of time: “the built form has to be constructed as 
an empty placeholder for meanings that have been eroded…rather than 
remembered” (p. 62). Such buildings manifest as signs of forgetting, of 
the failure of the city to assimilate the passage of time and the changes 
brought by it. Hence Mbembe’s description of an “architecture of 
hysteria” that reiterates the “pathological structure and hysteria 
inherited from the racial city” (p. 62). Switching between an analysis of 
architectural form and a description of hysteria as psychological 
condition, Mbembe draws attention to the Freudian postulate that 
hysterics suffer from repressed memories and fall prey to regressive 
forgetting. He is concerned here, in short, with the nostalgic attempt to 
ward off the movement of time: 
 
The architecture of hysteria in contemporary South Africa is 
the result of a painful, shocking encounter with a radical 
alterity set loose by the collapse of the [fully segregated] racial 
city. Faced with the sudden estrangement from the familiar 
resulting from the collapse of the racial city, this architecture 
aims to return to the “archaic” as a way of freezing rapid 
changes in the temporal and political structures of the 
surrounding world. It is an architecture characterized by the 
attachment to a lost object that used to provide comfort. A 
magic mirror and a specular moment, it allows the white 
subject to hallucinate the presence of what has been 
irretrievably lost…the hallucination has its origins in a form of 
white nostalgia” (pp. 62-63). 
 
Several moments within this text are worth emphasizing for the 
argument I will go on to develop. Nostalgia here is the result of 
something threatening and debilitating; it results in the attempt to 
freeze change; it is a mode of erasure operating against an obligation to 
remember; it entails the role of a type of hallucinatory comfort in the 
face of something that has been lost. 
 
 
Within the economy of the ego 
 
What is immediately noticeable about the above theorizations is that 
they bypass the psychological. This is not an incidental feature. Viewing 
nostalgia as a cultural and historical formation enables one to avoid 
claims of psychological reductionism, to (quite rightly) view nostalgia as 
an historical and political phenomenon that is always more than merely 
personal, individual. That being said, despite the critical leverage that 
the above ideas afford us, we need remain aware that what makes good 
sociological sense does not always prove psychologically accurate. That 
is to say, nostalgia’s proposed efficacy as (sociological) instrument of 
critique may be undercut by the psychological functions it continues to 
serve. Or, more boldly put: what operates as a progressive trajectory 
within the field of sociological theory might in fact simultaneously 
function as a bulwark against psychological change.  
This points to a crucial problem with many socio-cultural 
theorizations: the attempt to elide or minimize the psychical dimension 
of nostalgia. Nostalgia is, after all, despite the factors of social and 
political mediation, a mode of experience, of memory, indeed, of affect. 
To avoid consideration of these necessarily psychological aspects is 
tantamount to sociological reductionism. It seems important then to 
juxtapose socio-cultural and psychological approaches to nostalgia, to 
view political nostalgia – that of a given community or social group in a 
particular historical political era – as subject to the vicissitudes and 
functions that characterize nostalgia as a psychical phenomenon. It is 
crucial then to invoke that which many contemporary valorisations 
sideline, namely a sense of how nostalgia might function as a psychical 
operation.  
Laubscher (2011) highlights the fact that nostalgia occurs “within 
the economy of the ego”, suggesting thus that it is a process that falls 
within the parameters of the dominance of the ego. As such a 
phenomenon of the ego, nostalgia remains a fundamentally imaginary 
activity that idealizes the past and that remains necessarily linked to the 
operation of fantasy. We should stress here that the Lacanian notion of 
the imaginary points to those psychological operations that buttress and 
substantiate an ego’s sense of itself, either through a succession of 
images with which identification occurs, or via types of (mis)recognition 
that engender effects of understanding, completion and wholeness. In 
less overtly psychoanalytic terms, one might simply say that nostalgia 
seems typically to support an identity – be it of the single subject or a 
broader community - and those narrative forms that work to sustain it. 
One should note here that there is always a defensive and narcissistic 
quality to such imaginary, ego-serving operations: the priority of 
securing a likeable self-image invariably trumps the possibility of hearing 
anything that would prove disruptive. If nostalgia – as individual or 
group phenomenon - is predominantly an imaginary (or ego) function, 
then it remains a defensive formation, underscored by a fundamentally 
conservative impulse to resist any change to its regime of idealising self-
understandings. Inasmuch as nostalgia remains a mode of protection, an 
assurance, a comfort to an ego, then it cannot adequately aid us in the 
‘unselfing’ – to cite Wicomb’s (2011) term – which is such a crucial part 
of unsettling how one is psychologically-located relative to one’s own 
social and cultural history. 
 A brief tour of the psychological literature provides ample 
evidence of how nostalgia functions to assuage, support and 
substantiate an ego. For Sedikides, Wildschut & Baden (2004), nostalgia 
is not to be understood via the conceptualizations of 19th Century 
psychiatry as form of melancholia; variant of depression; “immigrant 
psychosis”; or as intense unhappiness or suffering.  Their reference to 
the New Oxford English Dictionary definition (“a sentimental longing… 
for the past…for a period or place with happy personal associations” 
(1998, p. 1266) enables them to situate nostalgia as a “positive 
experience…a predominantly positive, self-relevant emotion…[with] an 
affective structure [that] fulfils crucial functions” (p. 202). So, while for 
many authors there is a recognition of sadness and psychological pain 
within nostalgia (Davis, 1979; Hertz, 1990; Holbrook, 1993) - for after all, 
the nostalgic is confronted with the realization that their desired past is 
forever gone - this bitterness is often typified as fleeting (Peters, 1985), 
as offset by types of pleasure or enjoyment of past experiences (Chaplin, 
2000; Gabriel, 1993). 
 Davis’s (1979) influential account acknowledges the bittersweet 
and ambivalent qualities of nostalgia, whilst nonetheless calling 
attention to the positive tone of the evoked past. Sedikides et al (2004) 
are thus not without precedent in thinking of nostalgia as a 
disproportionately positive emotion which maintains a therapeutic 
potential to soothe the self from existential pangs. One of nostalgia’s 
existential functions, they claim, is precisely to substantiate identity, 
whether through reduction of uncertainty or the facilitation of identity 
attainment (Cavanaugh, 1989). For some, nostalgia protects identity 
(Kleiner, 1977), and should be viewed as an “ego ideal”, or as a 
mechanism for coping with loss of self-esteem and restoring self-worth 
(Kaplan, 1987). An effective self-affirmation tool (Steele, 1988), 
nostalgia’s recourse to an idealized past enables one to deal with a 
difficult future to strengthen and support identity (Gabriel, 1993). A 
stronger sense of selfhood is attained, “an increasingly unified self, by 
putting together pieces of past lives through nostalgia” (Sedikides et al, 
2004).  
Of course one need not agree with the above literature – geared 
as it is precisely towards the goal of ego-affirmation that a Lacanian 
approach would oppose - to grasp the point being made. Despite the 
ethical, reflective or ‘evolved’ potential of nostalgia asserted by the 
sociological literature, such critical gains are always shadowed by what 
in psychoanalytic terms is the very opposite of a transformative impulse: 
an ego-substantiating means of affirming, supporting and strengthening 
an identity. While this may seem of less than immediate political 
importance, one should bear in mind that such functions of ‘ego-
conservation’ are not simply psychological. They are emblematic of 
imaginary operations which pertain as much to the maintenance of  a 
given society’s self-image - its defensive narcissism in respect of its 
repressed histories, its inability to confront or recall difficult or self-
compromising truths – as that of an individual ego. 
 
Memory in the mode of the fetish  
 
The first psychoanalytic concept that I wish to introduce by way of my 
reconsideration of nostalgia is fetishism. Gevisser (2010) offers a telling 
remark in this respect. Nelson Mandela, he claims, made a political 
fetish out of his autobiography. This astute comment provides a telling 
example of what I would call fetishistic nostalgia, that is, a loving relation 
to a version of the past which is often recalled and that takes on both a 
cherished status and a protective function. Mandela’s story of his long 
moral struggle against apartheid took on a hegemonic dominance in the 
era just before and after the demise of apartheid. Subject to the claim 
that it sidelined other struggle histories, the text runs the risk of 
reducing the complexity of this historical period to a triumph of one 
man’s moral will.  Moodley (2008) for example contends that “the ANC 
[African National Congress] has rewritten the whole struggle”, insisting 
that the Black Consciousness Movement “has been written out of the 
struggle” (p. 274). Gibson (2011) makes a related point: “the narrative of 
a South Africa miracle, personalized by Mandela’s story – is almost a 
marketing gimmick for the benefit of the media” (p. 192). The ‘feel good’ 
factor of Mandela’s text, the unity it tacitly imposes on a series of 
discontinuous – indeed fractious and opposed – anti-apartheid struggles, 
along with the moral resolution of reconciliation that made its account 
of political change palatable to whites in particular, all of these qualities 
speak of its fetishistic appeal. Tirelessly repeated, such a fetishistic 
history makes a type of (‘new South African’) identity possible, it 
protects one against some or other ‘castration’ and it generates a 
degree of pleasure each time it is instantiated.  
 Žižek offers a distillation of the role of a fetish which, he claims “is 
the embodiment of the lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable 
truth” (p. 296). Differently put: the fetish is that isolated feature or 
activity that enables the disavowal of a threatening reality. Recourse to 
the traditional anthropological usage of the term proves helpful here: 
the fetish is that magical object revered by a given society because it 
creates a sense of order and control in a frightening world whilst holding 
a given belief-structure in place. More than just this, the fetish permits 
for an identity to be maintained; it functions to manage anxiety; and, not 
infrequently, to induce a type of love. Long Walk to Freedom and its 
political role in post-apartheid South Africa thus proves exemplary: a 
selective vision of the past is elevated above less comforting rival 
histories and done in such a way that keeps a series of deep political 
anxieties at bay. 
Crucial also, the fetish allows us to affirm that something is not 
the case; such is the role of fetishistic disavowal in psychoanalytic 
theory. Take for example the love that white South Africa has for 
Mandela. Not only a focus of libidinal investment and an icon that 
mitigates against anxieties of political transformation, Mandela, as 
loved-object provides the proof of a ‘not’, in this respect proof of the 
fact that we are not racist. A further aspect of the fetish comes into view 
here: the fetish – particularly the case in fetishised historical monuments 
and forms of remembrance – becomes in effect a license to forget, a 
type of structured forgetting (Hook, 2011b). This chimes with Mbembe’s 
(2008) earlier account of nostalgia as a mode or erasure operating 
against the obligation to remember. Returning to our example:  white 
investment in Mandela’s ‘walk to freedom’ could be said to be 
proportionate to white amnesia regards complicity in apartheid. 
Obviously such fetishism would need allow for multiple elaborations; 
different constituencies and generations may fetishize Mandela in 
varying ways (Mandela as grandfatherly and forgiving figure for some; 
radical protagonist of the armed struggle for others; saintly leader and 
Messiah for yet others). 1  Nevertheless, bearing in mind the earlier 
point about how personal forms of nostalgia remain cut from the cloth 
of the social, one can appreciate that such a latitude in particular 
fetishizations of Mandela may nonetheless add up to a type of national, 
indeed, political, fetishization. We might ask then of any instance of 
nostalgia: what does it enable one to disavow, to forget? What 
identification does such a reminiscence allow one to assert? What 
ideological world-view is thus maintained? Similarly: what threat is 
domesticated, what is effectively disproved by virtue of such a 
remembering?   
Clearly, not all instances of nostalgia are fetishistic. I have tried to 
emphasize above that nostalgia need not be seen as constitutively 
defensive; neither need it be seen as inescapably fetishistic. Inasmuch as 
                                                 
1 I owe this point to Leswin Laubscher. 
formations of nostalgia exist within the domain of ego however, 
supporting and extending its idealized self-representations, then these 
(defensive, fetishistic) tendencies remain a possibility even if they are 
not inherent aspects of nostalgic reminiscence. Having made this 
qualification, it is important nevertheless to stress that the notion of 
fetishistic nostalgia remains an important analytical tool. It enables us to 
highlight a distinctive operation occurring within nostalgia – a type of 
identity-preservation – and, more directly yet, it allows us to pin-point 
many of the ideological functions of the nostalgia in question (disavowal 
of the present, facilitation of a type of structured forgetting). This 
argument points us to a critical imperative: to focus not merely on the 
content but on the psychical and political functions of nostalgia. It is all 
too often the case that the captivating content and emotional 
gratifications of nostalgia mitigates against a developed analysis of the 
ideological uses to which it is being put. 
Fetishistic nostalgia, that is to say, runs counter to the effects of 
‘evolved’ or reflective types. More than just this, the preservative 
operation of such fetishistic uses of memory is enough to topple 
potentially explorative and ethical uses of nostalgia into less challenging 
and disruptive forms, into affirmations of the ideological status quo. This 
is not to insists that fetishism – and by extrapolation fetishistic nostalgia 
– is always politically reactionary.  The above example would testify to 
this: not all fetishistic investments in Mandela and the struggle narrative 
of Long Walk to Freedom are politically suspect. Few political 
movements – left or right – could dispense with all fetishistic 
recollections of the past. Although not necessarily reactionary, fetishistic 
nostalgia is necessarily conservative; it represents a reverence towards a 
protective object, a desperate clinging onto an image or token of a ‘safer 
before’. Such a thorough fantasmatic grounding in the past - which, 
importantly, protects against difference and reads the present always in 
terms of an idealized former time - remains aversive to change. 
 
In service of fantasy 
 
Reference to nostalgia’s role as fetish against change throws into 
perspective the fantasmatic nature of much nostalgic reminiscence. This 
quality is openly admitted by Boym in her description of nostalgia as “a 
romance with one’s own fantasy” (2001, p. xiii). Lacan deploys an 
illuminating metaphor in this respect, conceiving the fantasy scene as a 
frozen frame in a film that brings the sequence of images to a halt just 
prior to the moment of castration.  If nostalgia entails such a ‘stop-frame 
memory’ – an I idea I elaborate further below – then it seems necessarily 
to act against an order of destabilizing recognition. There is a further 
implication to be drawn here. If nostalgia, like fantasy, is conditioned by 
a certain impossibility, should we not then view it as a fantasmatic 
formation in the technical sense of an imaginary figuration that 
attempts to remedy an impasse, to make good on a lack? This would fit 
with Mbembe’s (2008) account of white fetishism as a mode of 
hallucinatory comfort in the face of threatening change. If this is the 
case, then from a psychoanalytic perspective, we need to take nostalgia 
seriously. Nostalgia in fact might be said to possess a diagnostic 
function: it contains within it an implicit diagnosis of current social ills, 
along with a potent ‘imaginary of loss’. The latter would serve as an 
indication both of certain prospective melancholic attachments, and – 
perhaps surprisingly - of a particular set of fears that strike to the very 
heart of a given community’s constitutive identifications. 
 The parallel between fantasy and nostalgia also points to a 
problem. Clinically speaking, fantasy is what must be traversed, worked-
through, dissipated. True enough, it needs to be present within the 
analysis, elicited, drawn out, explored; such an objective can be viewed 
as a precondition of a psychoanalytic cure. Then again, it makes no 
clinical sense to remain enthralled with the fantasy; such a path can only 
lead to a shoring-up of the imaginary, an consolidation of self-
comforting images. Although it anchors and frames our perspective 
upon reality, fantasy harbours illusions; it screens out discomforting 
knowledge; it entails its own rewards, its own types of enjoyment, and – 
at least in this sense – typically feeds complacency, resignation, 
mitigating against any change that would upset a given libidinal 
economy. Fantasy in and of itself – as is I would argue is the case with 
nostalgia - maintains no inherently progressive potential. It is what we 
do with fantasy or nostalgia that counts, how their comforting images, 
their selective reminiscences of the past may be connected to a broader 
strata of related but less readily accessed memories and associations. 
Inasmuch nostalgia operates to support and extend fantasy – we might 
offer the notion of fantasmatic nostalgia here – then we would do well 
not to celebrate its transformative potential without first investigating 
the defensive functions to which it may be put.  
 
The lie of affect 
 
The topic of anxiety, introduced above, leads us into a discussion of 
nostalgic affect. It also provides a way of extending the idea of nostalgia 
as protective device. Given that anxiety is so often associated with loss 
in psychoanalysis theory, and that nostalgic reminiscence is premised 
precisely on an experience of a lost past, then we might claim that 
anxiety is a characteristic affect of nostalgia. This may seem 
unconvincing, particularly if we take as given the oft-cited ‘bittersweet’ 
quality as the predominant affect of nostalgia. We need look beyond the 
surface here: the fact that not all nostalgia is obviously anxiety-
provoking need not impede our argument. We might adopt a 
hypothetical line here: the ‘sweetness’ of nostalgia – as in the fetish – 
perhaps has more to do with what it has enabled one to avoid, what is 
screened, than with the obvious content of what has been recalled. The 
bitterness – or its associated negativity - of affect may be a more reliable 
indicator here than the apparent sweetness.  
Without dismissing the importance of affect, we should bear in 
mind the Lacanian warning never to trust what would seem most 
obvious about a given affect. ‘Anxiety is the only affect that does not lie’ 
Lacan (1962-1963) famously insists. Freud, Lacan’s (1962-1963) 
cautioning to analysts is that emotions are continually subject to 
displacements, to substitutions of object, to evasions. As omnipresent as 
affect is, it is, in and of itself, not a form of truth. The affective intensity 
of nostalgia – its good feeling – may thus be an important marker to be 
aware of, but not necessarily one of its truthfulness.  That is to say, we 
often take the affective ambience of memory, or the clarity, certainty of 
particular events to be indexes of their truth-value. Here, following 
Freud, we should take such qualities seriously, but as indicators that 
something has fallen out of the picture and needs to be restored. 
What drives restorative nostalgia, says Boym, “is not the 
sentiment of distance and longing”, it is rather “the anxiety about those 
who draw attention to historical incongruities between past and present 
and…[question] restored tradition” (2001, pp. 44-45). Nostalgia here 
becomes a protection against such anxieties of history. We may add 
then to the list of critical questions apropos the uses and function of 
nostalgia. How does anxiety factor into the particular use of nostalgia we 
are concerned with? What is the particular anxiety the nostalgia seeks to 
mediate? Kammen asserts that “Nostalgia…is essentially history without 
the guilt” (1991, p.688). Accepting this idea means that we should ask 
also: how might guilt be operating behind the scenes of the particular 
instantiation of nostalgia we are witnessing? 
A broader critique begins to emerge here. If nostalgia is an 
outcome, an effect, a symptom, then we need look beyond the apparent 
contents and feelings of nostalgia to its causative conditions, to the role 
of such symptomatic contents. The valorization of nostalgia’s imaginary 
properties limits us to descriptive as opposed to properly analytical 
readings. Preoccupations with imaginary features blinds us to the 
underlying psychical or political functions of the nostalgia, it prevents us 
from plotting the dynamic role of nostalgia, its part in a broader libidinal 
economy. 
 
Screen-memory nostalgia 
 
Early on in his career, Freud’s attentions were drawn to type of memory 
that stalled clinical work. These were typically childhood memories, 
often very vivid, that appeared to latch onto a trivial facet of experience. 
While their broader meaning seemed uncertain, such memories would 
repeatedly surface, remaining cut off from a broader associative 
network. Such ‘screen-memories were for Freud a compromise between 
the pressure exerted by troubling past experiences that could not easily 
be retrieved, and the need to keep such memories at bay. They were – 
indeed, are - like static snapshots whose formal exaggerations and 
triviality alert us to the fact that something has been excised. The idea 
that a dialectical relationship exists between memory and forgetting of 
course bears a distinguished philosophical lineage. For Heidegger (1927), 
memory is possible only on the basis of forgetting; for Ricoeur (2004) 
forgetting is itself a species of memory. Screen-memories are something 
of a case in point: they are the trace – an index - of what has been cut 
out, forgotten, repressed. 
Part of what is so interesting about screen-memories is the 
amplification of formal features they present. Screen-memories entail a 
type of stasis: one scene within an associative train has been 
accentuated, made ‘extra-memorable’, a particular feature has been 
exaggerated so as to lock out a less acceptable memory or implication. 
They are over-compensations by means of form for what cannot be 
retrieved.  A similar logic holds in fetishism, where there is likewise a 
‘hyper-cathexis’ (of the fetish object/activity) working to the ends of 
defense. In the screen-memory the cathexis is realized in 
embellishments of form. Hence the idea that in clinical psychoanalysis 
we often need to read form above content. Attention to formal features 
of the memory – unusual clarity or detail; inability to move forward or 
backward in an associative sequence; repetitions, doublings; saturations 
of colour, etc. – proves crucial, for such features provide clues to what 
has been ‘extracted’. 
This returns us to Medalie’s (2010) assertion that formal features 
may indicate the failure of memory to transcend unreflecting types of 
nostalgia. An attention to form likewise allows us to approach in a new 
light Maier’s (1995) comment that nostalgia is to memory as kitsch is to 
art. That is to say – ignoring the potential here for a problematic high art 
versus low popular culture seemingly implied - exaggerations (indeed, 
over-compensations) of form are signs that bolder associative work 
needs be done. More effort is required, in short, to connect past and 
present, to move from defensive to less readily-yielded forms of 
memory. Different strategies of recollection are required here, from 
free-associative attempts to reconfigure the past, to joint attempts at 
narrative memory-work, a topic I have addressed elsewhere (Hook, 
2011a). Indeed, given that a trace of the repressed exists in the form of 
the screen-memory, then nostalgic reminiscences are useful, even 
though they will need to be connected to more expansive types of 
memory, their more tangential qualities explored. If, as Freud insists, a 
‘footprint’ of the associated repressed memory remains within a screen-
memory, then this memory needs to be taken apart, approached from 
multiple different deconstructive perspectives such that an exercise of 
speculative reconstruction might take place.  
 
Apartheid nachträglichkeit 
 
One of the problems implied by many conceptualizations of nostalgia is 
that they often rely upon a clear-cut differentiation between past and 
present. Boym (2001) observes that the “romantic nostalgic” “insisted 
on the otherness of his object of nostalgia from…present life and kept it 
at a safe distance” (p. 13). Furthermore: “Nostalgia…is dependent on the 
modern conception of unrepeatable and irreversible time” (p. 13).  
Distinctions between evolved and restorative nostalgia often turn on 
precisely this point: critically-enabling types of nostalgia are those which 
succeed in effective juxtapositions of past and present; restorative forms 
treat past and present as mutually-exclusive. True enough, the nostalgic 
overlaying of past and present can, as in Dlamini’s (2009) analysis, 
succeed in upsetting a series of hegemonic social norms and political 
commonplaces. However, despite the efficacy of such juxtapositions, 
one cannot but suspect that we are dealing with temporary alignments 
of past and present that quickly revert back into a demarcated sense of 
‘then’ as opposed to ‘now’.  
If it is the case that talk of nostalgia often presupposes a linear 
and clearly differentiated conception of time, then a psychoanalytic 
perspective on non-linear psychical time might prove a viable ally in 
understanding relations of historical causality and agency. Psychical 
time, the temporality of the unconscious, does not, according to Freud, 
abide by a division of historical eras. As he repeatedly insists: the 
primary process logic of the unconscious has no respect for sequential, 
chronological time; the wishes and fantasies of infancy are as fresh in 
the unconscious as the lingering traces of the previous day. This non-
linear conception of time means not only that we appreciate the 
simultaneity of past and present, but that we understand the role of 
retroaction.   
The important notion of ‘deferred action’ - Freud’s (1950) idea 
nachträglichkeit – draws attention to the ‘after the fact’ impact of earlier 
events upon the present and the future. As early as 1895 Freud was 
concerned with the implanting of a pathogenic effect: something 
‘traumatic’ (typically of a sexual nature) occurs, yet it is not realized as 
such at the time. The seed that has been planted will only flower later - 
its germination reliant upon a subsequent event. This theorization is 
dependent upon an evident discontinuity between two events; for Freud 
this will be the onset of adult sexual life, in the socio-historical realm this 
may be supplied by historical rupture. It pays here to stress the factor of 
contingency: in both psychical and historical time we live within a 
condition of suspension, as if a pause-button had been pressed at 
various earlier (pre)‘traumatic’ experiences, with the effect that their full  
impact will only (if at all) be realized once re-activated by later 
developments.   
The ambiguities of Freud’s (1950) notion are multiple, particularly 
so in cases of concatenated or ‘overrunning’ histories such as that of the 
post-apartheid era. There is, firstly, the idea that the true significance of 
a past event will only be realized in a subsequent future, once 
retroactively triggered. Neither static nor consolidated then, the 
fragmentary residues of lingering histories themselves constitute latent 
modes of the present. What this ensures – a second important point - is 
the virtual quality of the present which, underscored by an as of yet 
indefinite past, remains itself precarious, open to further re-articulation. 
To speak of apartheid nachträglichkeit means then that this history has 
not as yet been fully resolved, that it underlies the present, conditioning 
what it – and its prospective futures – have not as yet become. We need 
add to this, thirdly, the prospect of the movement from the future to the 
past, the retroactive ‘determination’ of what has been by what is to 
come. This aspect of deferred action means that we are caught within 
the anxious possibility that the re-visioning of our past will necessarily 
change what ‘we will have been’.  
The pertinence of the psychoanalytic notion of retroactive 
causality to the post-apartheid context seems immediately evident. One 
might contend that the simultaneity of two eras – as signified by the 
ambiguous contraction ‘(post)apartheid’ – provides us with a case in 
point of historical nachträglichkeit, the sobering possibility, that is to 
say, of ‘the post-apartheid’ being viewed as apartheid’s deferred action. 
It helps here to provide a brief example of retroactive temporality, 
so as to emphasize the different analytical perspective opened up by the 
notion of deferred action. Barnard’s (2004) analysis of the satirical 
Bittercomix comic strips of South African artist Anton Kannemeyer cites 
the example of a typical work, “Blacks”, a nine-panel page rendered in 
the clear line style of Hergé’s Tintin images. A self-reflexive statement on 
the role of comics in conducting racist culture, the strip in question 
follows on from an earlier narrative, in which a young boy, Themba, is 
made by his parents to return a stack of Tintin comics to his white friend 
Daniel, because of their racist content. The sequence of panels in 
“Blacks” includes Kannemeyer himself, who opts, by way of response to 
this situation to quote a whole series of racially derogatory or loaded 
terms from the Afrikaans dictionary (Handwoordebook van die 
Afrikaanse Taal). An exercise in the type of pastiche that Bitterkomix so 
excels in, the resulting comic strip combines mock dictionary definitions 
for a whole series of apartheid era designations - “hottentot”, “woolly 
head”, “golliwog”, “Boss”, “Madam”, etc. – with a naïve, 1940’s style of 
comic book illustration.  
The resultant effect of disjunction is in part formal: Kannemeyer’s 
borrowings from earlier visual styles and verbal vernaculars turns past 
historical forms jarringly against their former horizons of meaning. Such 
an exercise in re-contextualization also of course relies on a double 
temporality. By retrieving once accepted apartheid terms – effectively 
authorized, moreover, in the formal register of dictionary definitions – 
into a public post-apartheid context, where such terms must be viewed 
as objectionable, Kannemeyer is making apparent the epistemic violence 
that had always been a part of apartheid culture. Crucial to the deferred 
action effect of his work – presumably more vividly present for those 
who knew or experienced apartheid – are two key considerations. The 
realization, firstly, that so much of what had been considered 
unobjectionable and normal within the sensibilities of apartheid (the 
language of ‘Boss’ and ‘Madam’), indeed, even innocent, appropriate for 
children (as in the case of Hergé’s Tintin), was thoroughly laced with 
racism. This is what makes the bluntness of Kannemeyer’s depiction, the 
undisguised quotation of apartheid terms and stereotypes, so forceful. 
Of course, the racist imaginary rendered in such child-friendly terms is 
far from over. The discomforting charge of the imagery – our second 
consideration – has much to do with the fact that such apartheid 
thinking still lingers. These images would be far less provocative, far less 
offensive - or so it would seem - if this past were not still with us. We 
have a case then of what is latent, unresolved in the past, indeed, 
repressed, being uncomfortably re-activated in the present.   
This is not, clearly enough, a case of nostalgia (except perhaps of 
the most perverse kind); a different type of historical juxtaposition is at 
work. One potential difference between the two concerns repression: 
nostalgia, as ego-function, seems typically to flow through the 
censorship of repression so as to deliver a palatable (even if bittersweet) 
memories. It is worth observing, as in this case, that effects of 
nachträglichkeit - inasmuch as such relations of causation are 
consciously realized - typically entail precisely a coming undone of 
repression. This seems integral to the notion of deferred action: there is 
a realignment of sorts, an epistemic shift, a break in memory – 
something tantamount to a repression - that separates two or more 
periods. This helps isolate a key difference between the affective 
experiences of nostalgia and deferred action. (We need of course bear in 
mind that as a theory of paradoxical temporal causation, 
nachträglichkeit may remain unconscious, not experienced as affect at 
all). Whereas nostalgia remains closer to an ego-consolidating spectrum 
of affects (as noted in the psychological literature cited above), deferred 
action is closer to that of anxiety. Freud’s (1950) reference to trauma in 
respect of nachträglichkeit is here instructive – instances of deferred 
action are typically destabilizing – and hence potentially ‘unselfing’ – 
inasmuch they involve an effective unmaking of one time (be it 
past/present/future) by another. 
We are now in a better position to draw conclusions regards how 
the concepts of nostalgia and nachträglichkeit compare as modes of 
historical reflection. Although in a nostalgic experience the past may be 
summoned, brought forcibly into the present, a nostalgic sensibility is 
arguably less than concerned with the relations of causation obtaining 
between these two points. The underlying clinical objective behind the 
notion of deferred action, on the other hand, concerns precisely the 
attempt to better understand the complex relations of psychical 
causality that connect past, present and future, each of – to stress the 
point - remains simultaneously active.  Taking such a non-linear 
approach to history seriously means not only that we remain aware of 
how the apartheid past will continue to be subject to multiple re-
writings. It means that today’s post-apartheid era is still effectively 
under-defined, subject to revision. It likewise means that the post-
apartheid future necessarily holds the promise of traumatic re-
incursions of inadequately processed or ‘ungrieved’ events the 
significance of which have yet to be realized.  
Such an approach seem the very opposite of nostalgic returns to 
the past which are, as we are often told, anchored in the present. The 
time of nachträglichkeit is, to cite Birksted-Breen (2003), a 
‘reverberation time’, never easily partitioned into historical divisions. 
Rather than affirming the status of the present or indulging in brief 
comparative reflections, this approach to temporality subverts a sense 
of the ‘here and now’, making apparent that there is no ‘pure present’. 
The notion of nachträglichkeit may hence be read against that of 
nostalgia. Whereas the latter may be accused of presentism, of 
remaining forever stuck in an idealized past, the critical sensibilities of 
nachträglichkeit undercut and destabilize such divisions, emphasising 
patterns of temporal reverberation and repetition that makes such 
historical localizations untenable.  
Let me conclude this section with three brief assertions. Firstly, 
the sensibilities of nostalgia cannot, in my view, adequately 
accommodate the paradoxical relations of causality existing between 
past, present and future that can be grasped via an appreciation of 
nachträglichkeit. Secondly, the ego-affirming qualities of nostalgia 
appear, most typically, to leave repression undisturbed. An awareness of 
retroactive causality is, by contrast, more anxiety-provoking and 
destabilizing, drawing attention as it does to the psychical simultaneity 
of past, present and future, and to various epistemic breaks – 
repressions – characterizing that history. Thirdly, an awareness of 
deferred action seems crucial in understanding the temporality of 
transitional societies, such as that of post-apartheid South Africa, where 
adjoining historical eras are often less discrete and more mutually-
determining than we like to think. 
 
Contrapuntal resistances 
 
In what has gone above I have attempted not only to introduce the topic 
of nostalgia and its ‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ uses, but to explore 
certain of the psychical dimensions of nostalgia often neglected in the 
sociological literature. As a vehicle of critical memory practice at the 
service of historical retrieval, nostalgia no doubt has its uses. I have 
noted its prospective use as diagnostic instrument; its value in de-
familiarizations of the present and in critical juxtapositions of past and 
present. I have also questioned whether attempts to utilize the 
‘reflective’ nostalgia have not under-estimated nostalgia’s role as 
defensive formation. A series of psychoanalytic concepts has proved 
useful here, enabling us to grasp how nostalgia may operate 1) in the 
economy of the ego, 2) in the mode of the fetish, 3) in the service of 
fantasy, 4) as an affect concealing anxiety, 5) as screen-memory and, 6) 
as means of reifying the present which fails to explore the (often 
retroactive) causative relations obtaining between past, present and 
future.  
Nostalgia, it then follows, is often, but not solely, a protective 
device – a way of screening history – that preserves select elements of 
the past while enabling a structured forgetting of others. A means of 
strengthening and comforting an ego (be it of individual or group), 
nostalgia often appears conservative in its ends, aversive to change. If 
the above arguments are to be credited, nostalgia is, furthermore, adept 
at neutralizing anxiety and in obscuring (retroactive) patterns of 
causation that defy the demarcations of past, present and future 
entailed by linear conceptions of history. What follows is a cautioning: 
we should investigate each of these possible functions within any given 
instance of nostalgia before proclaiming its transformative potential. I 
hope by now the pertinence of this critique to the field of peace 
psychology is evident.  If, to follow Freud’s (1914) still pertinent maxim, 
what we cannot recall we are bound to repeat, then, especially in post-
conflict societies, we need remain vigilant regards the lures of those 
defensive forms of memory which help us to forget. 
Notwithstanding the above conclusions, we may nevertheless ask, 
as I intimated from the very outset: might some forms of nostalgia not 
work against such defenses of memory? In closing I would like to 
consider very briefly the beginning of an answer to such a question, and 
do so by looking beyond the realm of psychoanalytic theory to a very 
different critical instrument, Edward Said’s (2003) notion of the 
contrapuntal. Said borrows this term from music composition as a way 
of making sense of the conflicted experience of life as an exile. The 
moment of the contrapuntal is one of layered experience; of overlapping 
territories and powerful contrasts; of friction and discordance. This 
experience is often painful and destabilizing; previous experiences are 
juxtaposed against present conditions in such a way that neither gains 
ascendance. The temptation for resolution is kept at bay; there is no 
transcending harmony able to bridge the gap between past and present. 
Dissonance itself becomes here a means of critical realization. Said’s 
description bears striking parallels with our own. The contrapuntal 
moment, unlike the nostalgic, does not succumb to the defenses, the 
comforts, the neutralizations of an ego-enhancing narrative. It is this 
factor - that of ‘unselfing’ - the ability to upset rather than affirm the 
consolation of  such ego-affirming narratives that talk on nostalgia 
typically lacks. 
Said’s account of exile, at the same time undeniably of nostalgia 
and yet hopelessly at odds with much of the literature on the topic, calls 
to mind the distinction Tacchi (2003) makes in respect of American as 
opposed to Greek notions of nostalgia. Whereas the former takes 
nostalgia to be a trivializing form of romantic sentimentality, the Greek 
conceptualization emphasizes ongoing pain, an inability to adapt, the 
persistence of longing and desire for transformation. As Pickering & 
Keightley (2006) emphasize, the American view forecloses the possibility 
of the past ushering in a transformative role in the present; the more 
visceral Greek conception “evokes a range of bodily experiences to 
negotiate the past and…allows the past a transactional role in the 
present” (p. 934). It is perhaps through the adaptation of the Greek 
notion into the American, through the anesthetization of nostalgia’s 
qualities of pain and disturbance in favour of ego-enhancing aspects, 
that much of the critical potential of the notion has gone amiss. We 
might put it this way: it is precisely at the moment that the ego-comforts 
and protections of nostalgia are dissipated, at the point when nostalgia 
becomes less sweet, more troubling, more anxious - exactly when the 
American notion reverts to the Greek - that nostalgia becomes useful to 
us. 
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